This paper solves the dynamic investment problem of a risk averse agent compensated with a performance related bonus plus a salary guaranteed up to a certain level of underperformance. The main contribution is to explicitly take into account the financial fragility of the principal [employer], by making the tolerated underperformance a function of the principal's net asset value.
Introduction
The asset management literature devotes a large attention to the impact of incentives on manager's risk taking behaviour, which crucially impacts large areas of the financial industry.
The same mix of risky financial guarantees and option-based compensation being at stake in levered financial institutions as a whole and in the branches of financial conglomerates, the effects of such incentives are crucial for regulators as well as for those who design intra-group guarantees and financial support.
In delegated portfolio management, a structural model is needed to explain state-dependent risk taking (Koijen, 2014) . 1 The main contribution of this paper is to provide a structural model for manager's risk-taking that takes into account the fragility of the principal who provides guarantees.
The manager is endowed with (1) a performance-related bonus, (2) a fixed salary payable up to a certain level of underperformance, where (3) the tolerated underperformance is an increasing function in the principal's wealth [net asset value] .
Conditional on a given [fixed] value of the principal's wealth, (1) and (2) provide risk shifting and leverage incentives when the fund has a modest relative underperformance.
More precisely, (1) and (2) constitutes a non-linear remuneration contract which yields non-linear, state dependent allocation to a speculative portfolio defined, depending on the context, as a mix of the mean-variance efficient [MVE] portfolio and of an orthogonal portfolio which purely reflects the specific skills of the manager. The allocation to the speculative portfolio is humped shape between a minimum acceptable underperformance and a high reference point, endogeneously determined, which has the interpretation of a high-water mark.
To analyse (3), consider that a fall in the principal's wealth diminishes the tolerated underperformance and risk-shifting incentives, thus diminishing the value of the manager's remuneration contract; then, because the principal's wealth is stochastic, the manager hedges this change by being under-invested in the assets that correlate with the principal's wealth, typically its shares.
We show the empirical validity of this model by showing that managers respond to the variation in their principal's health [their employer, the management company]. The analysis is preliminary, but, interestingly, when analysing Petajisto (2013) 's data, we find that the variation in risk-taking from peer managers (obtained by the author after matching this database with the fundamental information from CRSP) is the primary source of variation in manager's active share and tracking error.
Fuzzy matching between the name of the asset management company and a database for financial institutions will permit a more accurate quantification of the impact of the principal's financial fragility on the agent's behaviour -the share price or credit spreads of the principal can serve as proxies for its financial fragility, for the subset of companies that are listed.
Related Literature
Our analysis of the dynamic investment problem of a manager with option compensation but risky guarantees relates to Carpenter (2000) , who studies the risk-shifting behaviour from an asset manager with a guaranteed income plus a performance-related bonus. It also relates to (Berkelaar and Post, 2004) , who detail the investment strategy of a loss-averse investor, and to Basak and Shapiro (2001) , who study an investor with Value-at-Risk constraints, because in all cases the utility function of the agent is (locally) non-concave.
More recently, Buraschi et al. (2014) extended the model of Koijen (2014) to study hedge fund incentives with incentives to limit underperformance to a floor (which can be interpreted in our context by a limited external guarantee from the principal).
We extend these problems by considering that the floor, or guarantee offered to the agent, is stochastic and depends on the principal's wealth.
The paper is organised as follows:
The following subsection 2 defines the economy, compensation contract and optimisation problem, section 3 studies the optimal risk-shifting program. 4 gives a detailed analysis of a simple case, with 4.1 focussing on numerical integration and 4.2 deriving the weight strategy. Section 5 summarises the preliminary results from the on-going empirical analysis, and 6 concludes.
Appendices are organised as follows: A defines notations more accurately, B derives the optimal program, C provides a numerical and graphical illustration, and D provides a generalisation of the simple model to various settings (numeraires, definition of manager's remuneration, utility function), and E details the link between this remuneration contract and those studied earlier.
Summary of Notations and Problems Studied 2.1 The economy
We live in a continuous-time Black-Scholes economy where the benchmark L has volatility σ L .
As formalised by El Karoui et al. (2005) , the optimal portfolio in the presence of constraints on the utility function is an option on an optimal 'unconstrained' portfolio. In the case of utility on terminal wealth, the unconstrained portfolio has the form A u T = (ν 0 M T ) (−1/γ) where M is the stochastic discount factor (dM t = M t · (−r · dt − θ · dW )). If the utility is CRRA on the ratio X T /L T , the unconstrained portfolio is (proportional to)
A u T = (L T ) (1−1/γ) · (M T ) (−1/γ) , aggregating two risk drivers. 2 If as in Koijen (2014) or Buraschi et al. (2014) , the manager has the skilled to generate above market returns, A u will be a speculative portfolio which weights π u will combine the MVE and an orthogonal long-short portfolio which reflects her extra skills.
We will thus achieve notational economy and general notations by using A u as the driver of the strategy. F u and G have correlation ρ. m * is multiplicative constant that scales the 'participation' of optimal, option-like strategies to the underlying unconstrained A u .
2 In the former case, A u has volatility σ A u = ||θ || γ , in the later A/L has volatility σ F u = ||θ −σ L || γ See Appendix A for details on the economy and notations.
The agent can design her strategy to extract wealth from the principal. The solution will be noted A * T = up T + put T .
The manager's remuneration
A manager receives a fixed wage compensation which in most relevant situations entails some risk, for instance job loss if the principal's financial situation deteriorates strongly while the manager under-performs, an aspect which can be modelled as a default risk of the principal when the agent's losses are high compared to the principal's wealth.
So, the agent we study has limited liability up to a certain under-performance that depends on the stochastic wealth of the principal. 3 The manager's compensation reads:
where Y T is the principal's net asset value, and m G ≤ 1 is the fraction of the net asset value that the principal is ready to allocate to the agent to compensate for the losses that result from underperformance β · [L T − A T ] + , and α is the number of options granted to the manager. 4
The manager's utility function
The manager has a simple CRRA utility with risk aversion γ.
3 It could be chosen to model the financial fragility of a third partye.g., that of the prime broker. This represents the case when G, the net asset value of the provider of the guarantee, is directly traded.
4 Generally, the principal's tolerance for under-performance by the agent is not only limited, it also depends on the residual net asset value of the principal. A financial conglomerate, even provides a formal guarantee to each of its subsidiaries, may limit it to a fraction of its net wealth, so m G << 1 but in the order of 10% − 30% and β = 1 is to be expected. In fund management, if there are no performance fees, it is expected that β < α and these be in the range of .05% − 5%. If there are performance fees, then while β remains in the same range, α, the fraction of the performance given to the manager, could be in a 1% − 15% range. Note that in the case of high water mark, the initial value of the benchmark could be above one, or L 0 > A 0 is possible. The principal of a defined-benefit pension plan makes good on the plan deficit, up to a value bounded by its net asset value, and in this very specific case one may consider m G = 1 with β = 1, which means that the guarantee cannot be legally limited.
The use of a common numeraire L means that is is efficient to use ratios of asset values to liabilities as notional quantities. We denote G = Y L and F = A L (these quantities are martingales under the forward-measure Q L ).
Main insight
In this paper we study how the agent optimally behaves when she aims to simultaneously secure the promise made to him and optimally exploit the remuneration incentives given to him by the option-based compensation.
Conditionally to a given G T , it is easy to see that the problem is similar either to that of Buraschi et al. (2014) (this happens when m G · G T < k) or to that of Carpenter (2000) , namely when m G · G T > k.
The stochastically limited guarantee introduces new features to the optimal asset allocation by the agent. The risk in going from the Carpenter (2000) model to the Buraschi et al. (2014) model is hedged, i.e., the agent also has a hedging demand to offset the impact of a deterioration in principal's wealth [risk tolerance].
In addition, a reduction in the principal's net wealth reduces its tolerance for underperformance, thus reducing the agent's leverage.
The dependence of the agent on the principal's wealth in expected to lead fund managers to increase their tracking error to make up for individual under-performance when the management company experiences profits, while during times of market crash, when the management company experiences losses, fund managers are expected to act much more prudently and revert to their benchmarks.
Although this setting is very simple, the non-convex region is identical over a variety of configurations, and various extensions are given in Appendix D.
Maximum Risk Shifting

Incentives
In such agency problem, the agent is generally given an option or participation to the success of the firm to give him incentives to exert effort. However, the guaranteed income in case of failure gives incentives to gambling. One can think of a father and son relationship, where the son may enter a risky career because he knows he will benefit from the unconditional support of his father in case of failure.
In the static optimisation problem at time T , for any given G T , the (conditional) nonconvex optimisation problem is similar to the one in Carpenter (2000) , Berkelaar and Post (2004) , or more recently Buraschi et al. (2014) and illustrated in figure 1.
In our case, the agent retrieves the same utility for any limited shortfall compared to Thus, in this problem with an external guarantee, the agent extracts as much wealth as she can from the principal. The guarantee also induces non-convexity, and the manager will only target an asset value at least equal to the tangency of the utility to A − , conditional on these two values.
In Carpenter (2000) , A − = 0 independently of L T (or any other factor), so that A + also is fixed, and the analysis can be pursued according to A + defined such as
where U(A) is a shortcut notation for U(X(A)), i.e., U(A − ) = U(K). Figure 1 illustrates the non-convexity that arises conditional to a given value of Y T and L T , for varying levels of A u T . Here, m G β Y T = 0.3 (denoted m G in the graph) and L T = 1 (alternatively, m G · G T = .3 and the x-axis represents F u T ). In case of success, the agent has total wealth greater than X + (.3) ≈ 1.3. The utility of the terminal A T -before the principal makes good on losses-is non-convex: the utility of any A T < L T is that of [k − G T ] + = .7. Between k = 1 and A + (G T ) ≈ 1.3, the agent also prefers in expectation reaching A + (G T ) ≈ 1.3 with some probability and A − (G T ) ≈ .7 with another. A − (G T ) is stochastic and is lower when the principal is richer because larger recovery contributions are then possible, and the reverse is true for A + (G T ).
The non-contractible agent follows the following program:
The solution will be noted F * T = up T + put T , where up T delivers (1 + 
where the line ((F − ,U(K)), (F + ,U(F + )))) is tangential to the utility curve at (F + ,U(F + )).
The agent achieves a partly binary payoff, ending either with significant profits or with losses at the maximum level that can be tolerated by her principal. Risk-shifting and riskmanagement coexist, because a minimum funding value needs to be secured. Furthermore, all values (and thus the replicating strategy) will depend on G T .
However, because the risk in the guarantee is driven by G, the stochastic G needs to be taken into account in the dynamic replicating strategy (see weight strategy).
Implementation with the Principal's Shares
In our Black-Scholes economy, ρ GF is a constant, or would be a deterministic function of t if interest-rates are a Vasicek. 5
Share Value
The terminal payoffs at time T + to the principal / shareholders (after losses from maintaining the salary are discounted from the principal's NAV) are:
When m G · G T < k, the principal only commits the faction m G of his wealth to support the agent, the shareholder receiving 1 − m G (in case of underperformance). Then
and principal shares S are hedging instruments for G. Because only put T has value in the exercise region (up T = 0),
When one trades principal shares, the number of principal's shares traded by the agent in order to hedge principal risk reads
However, S thus also is sensitive to F u (via the probability of success), and thus to the performance of the MVE portfolio. So, in general, one must adjust the position in the underlying F u t as follows:
Remark 3.2. Note that the agent can hedge her exposure to the principal's net asset value G by dynamically trading S, up to the point where the positions can effectively be traded.
When m G = 1, the shares become insensitive to G in the region where m G < k, at which point they cannot be relied upon for hedging changes in G.
Price and weight strategy 4.1 Pricing via numerical integration
Notations and generic tools
We denote X(· · · ) = E Q X [1 (··· ) ] with X either L, Y or A u . 6 The events described in (· · · )
are of the form (<> F + , <> k). Here, (> F + , < k) indicate the events (mF u T F + (m G G T ), m G G T < k), while (<, <) indicate (mF u T < F + (m G G T ), m G G T < k), and (·) leaves a variable unspecified: (> F + ) ≡ (> F + , ·) indicates the events (mF u T F + (G T ), ∀G T ).
Then:
In general terms, we note that the numerical computation of these integrals is as follows:
where the function d X (S t , K) denotes the traditional Black-Scholes normalised moneyness (position of the strike K in the forward distribution of S T given S t , where S is either G or F u ), 7 under the probability measure where X (P, F u , or G) is the numeraire.
where integration is performed across v = d X (G t , G T ), the standardised values of G T , and where F + (v) is a shorthand notation for F + (G X (v)), with G X (v) the inverse function of d X 6 Y and Y are used for the asset-forward numeraire as in any normal pricing formula, and under Q L the ratio F t = A t /L t is a Martingale.
7 The parameters σ S , σ X , ρ SX , t and T are implied.
relative to G T . 8
Assuming β > k, 9 we have F + (m G G T |m G G T > k) = F + (k). Then X(·, > k) is a Normal c.d.f., X(<, > k) and X(>, > k) are Bivariate c.d.f., while X(·, <), X(> F + , <) and X(< F + , <) require numerical integration. for instance, with the above notations,
Then it will be handy to compute separately X(> F + , ·) = X(> F + , >) + X(> F + , <). for instance, A(> F + ) = A(> F + , < k)
+ A(>, >)
A(> F + ) = A(> F + , <)
+ A(> F + , <)
A(> F + ) =
   
We also note that for any smooth concave utility, F + (G T ) is a differentiable function, and d X (F + (v), X(), up t and put t have continuous derivatives w.r.t. F u t and G t .
Then, with a CRRA utility, the put and up options are integrals of a stream of BlackScholes univariate options, which ensures that this strategy can be replicated if F u and G are traded, and the derivation of the weight strategy is detailed in Section 4.2 on the facing page.
Pricing
From (3), we have F * T = up T + put T , with: β G T ] + ·1 (<F + ,<) since in the region (< F + , > k) the manager achieves A * T ≡ 0 as in Carpenter (2000) . Thus for pricing,
Remark 4.1. In fact, (·, > k) is a region where the principal provides virtually unlimited 8 Formally speaking, we use the inverse function of d X (S t , K) relative to the ('variable') 'strike' K, but we now normalise all possible values of the underlying, not just one strike.
9 When β < k, the threshold for m G · G T is β instead of k. Said otherwise, F − = 0 for m G · G T = min(β , k)).
support (is willing to accept any under-performance) to the agent, with the value of the funds falling all the way to zero in case her objectives are not met. In practice this may not be a desirable feature, so the principal could design more explicit contractual or incentives floor to underperformance.
Delta-Hedging
Semi-closed form pricing formulaes are derived for the current problem, and the level of complexity remains minimal for this problem thanks to the constant opportunity set and the remuneration is proportional to the benchmark. Other cases require an additional level of integration (usually without change in the interpretation).
Deltas of B(. . . ) Recalling the notation on page 11: X(> F + , >) = E Q X [1 m·F u T F + (G T ),m G ·G T >k ], for X = (L, A, Y), we have:
deltas of X(> F + , <)
+ T (v)·k 1/2 ·G t 3/2 ·σ F ·τ 1/2 X(<, <) is derived in a very close fashion, and the weight strategy follows. 10 Finally,
so the shares are priced as:
S t = G t ·Y(> F + , <)+G t ·Y(> F + , >)+(1−m G )·G t ·Y(<, <)+G t ·Y(> F + , <)−k ·L(> F + , <)
5 Empirical analysis
Visual presentation
As shown by Petajisto (2013) , the active risk taking from fund managers has experienced an important downwards trend beyond the business cycle. Figure 2 and 3 show the mean active share and tracking error over time, and 4 show a boxplot of the distribution of the tracking error of non-indexed funds.
In these graphs, at each date, the left panel shows funds which have peers (other funds managed by the same asset management company, according to CRSP descriptive data), while the right panel shows all funds.
Out of a total of 3333 funds, 2983 funds that have peers (at at least one date), of 2584 are non-indexed funds. This leaves us with 61803 observation (funds * dates), and 50565 for non-indexed funds. 11
10 Note first that
∂ F u ; then the weight strategy is π G =
, and . 11 The actual number of data point in the regression table is slightly lower, because the TE and AS is not always available. The actual number of observation is not systematically reported in tables 2 -3, but it equal to one plus the number of observations plus the number of variables in the line degrees of freed. The whiskers are omitted and only represented by their staples or end points. The outliers are also omitted for clarity. The box width is a function of the number of funds reported at each date -they are thicker towards the end of the sample.
Preliminary analysis
Measuring the influence of the financial fragility of the firm requires additional data collection, and will restrict the number of asset management companies.
We thus seek preliminary evidence of the influence of firm conditions by assessing whether, before taking fund-specific structural information into account, the fund tracking error, hereafter AS (resp. active share, hereafter AS) clusters within fund management companies. To do so, we regress the fund TE against two variables, the mean of the Peer TE (resp Peer AS) taken as the mean of the TE of other funds managed by the same company at the same date, and the global Mean TE (resp global Mean AS) taken as the mean of the TE of all 12 funds reporting at that date. The Peer TE has better explanatory power, see numerical data.
As shown by the x-axis on the left panel of 5, the Peer TE is (by construction) more volatile than the Mean TE. That it has a bigger explanatory power is thus a meaningful indication of the influence of the manager's behaviour by company conditions. is the mean AS (resp., TE) of funds from peers, i.e., , from the other funds managed by the same family. Tables 2 and 3 focus on non-indexed funds, 13 but the results are qualitatively similar for all funds.
For the TE and AS alike, the most significant model is that including only the attitude of peers.
It is possible that TE and AS play a very different role in the risk taking of funds.
Following Petajisto (2013) , interpreting TE as systematic exposure to the MVE, and AS as a skill exposure (orthogonal to the MVE), is a possible explanation or the better explanatory power of both market conditions and peers' attitude.
After all, the relative exposure of all managers without skills is similar (it is an exposure to the MVE, in theory uniquely defined, in practice very likely well correlated to main market indices or market risk ). Managers with such exposure are thus likely to overperform or underperform at the same time, their incentives and risk taking would thus tend to react similarly to important market changes.
Detailed analysis is on-going and will follow in updated versions of this paper. The best model by far uses Peer TE alone: the F-statistic in (2) is greater than (1) with Mean TE, and (3) Mean TE +Peer TE degrades the F-statistic. Within non-indexed funds, the Peer TE explains 40% of the cross-section of the variance, and this is the most significant model. 
Conclusion
This paper details the optimal strategy pursued by a non-contractible agent endowed with an option-based compensation plus a salary guaranteed by the principal, when the guarantee is risky.
The agent takes into account the changes in the principal's wealth to define the amount of risk it can take; furthermore, the agent hedges against changes in the principal's wealth;
then an increase in the principal's wealth diminishes the value of the funds managed by the agent.
When the principal's wealth falls, the agents takes less risk, reverting close to the benchmark, but maintaining a hedge position against the risk of further deterioration of the principal's wealth.
In a fund management context, one would expect that during times of crisis, the manager who has underperformed closes all her active positions (reducing tracking error to very low levels), while remaining underweighted in the stock of the financial company that employs him when it is traded.
Preliminary empirical analysis shows the managers' unconditional risk-taking behaviour (without taking her relative performance into account) is primarily influenced by firm-level conditions, more than by aggregate ones, and we expect to show that the main driver is precisely the financial fragility of the principal.
Other implications are expected to be testable with time. It would thus be expected that fund managers outperform their benchmark during recessions (provided that their principal, the asset management company, is too affected), but while underperforming at the start of expansions/recovery periods, only taking incentives into account. It is also expected that the greatest over and underperformance are realised during 'booms', when the principal has solid wealth.
It is also expected that hedging demands imply the manager being underweighted the principal's assets when she underperforms during economic downturns, which potentially biases downwards measures of performance (the sole active position of the manager may be to underweight the principal's shares, which is thus a rather undiversified position.)
In theory, such a structural model could help measuring manager's alpha and skills, suppressing a potential source of bias in previous structural models, the dependence of the manager's risk aversion to the financial fragility of her sponsor. However, to bring the model to the data, one needs both details fund holdings and measure of financial fragility, so, this question will likely be left for further research.
A The Economy and the Set-Up of the Model
A.1 Definitions and the Economy
The assumptions and notations are generic notations for either benchmark, numeraire or liabilities, but take into account the principal's riskiness and the interaction of the accounts of principal and agent.
We consider a continuous-time, finite-horizon [0, T ] economy where prices are exogenous to the agent. Uncertainty is represented by a filtered probability space (Ω, F, {F t }, P), on which an n-dimensional Brownian motion W is defined. All stochastic processes are assumed to be adapted to (F t ,t ∈ [0, T ]), the augmented filtration generated by W. The market is complete and all stated (in)equalities involving random variables hold P-almost surely.
The vector of traded risky assets P follows the process: dP t = diag(P t ) · (µ t · dt + σ t · dW )
where the vector µ t represents the risk premium and the matrix σ t stacks the volatility of the assets. The agent's benchmark L t has volatility σ Lt . We denote θ the risk premium process, θ t = σ −1 t · (µ t − r t ).
The stochastic discount factor, M, has diffusion dM t = −M t · (θ t · dW + r t · dt) and value The martingale measure Q is defined by ζ t = M t · e t 0 (r t ·dt) with respect to the historical probability measure P. As the utility is on the funding ratio, i.e., on a measure of wealth where the liability serves as a numeraire, we use, by default, the corresponding liability forward martingale measure Q L . F T = A t L t , the funding ratio at time 0 t T , is a martingale under Q L , so that in all equations, the budget constraint on A T is written instead as a budget constraint on A T under Q L , without discounting.
The principal has a net asset value Y denoted by G = Y L in the numeraire of the liability. G has volatility σ G = σ Y − σ L . The share value S will be determined endogenously.
For notational economy, we denote F u T = (M T · L T ) − 1 γ the optimal asset to benchmark ratio of an unconstrained CRRA investor with relative risk aversion γ. The manager will in the main choose her allocation to F u t (or A u t = F u t · L t ) and her allocation to the replicating portfolio of G. 14 We also suppress the time subscript on volatilities. 15 m, the participation to A u T , is a positive number chosen so that the budget constraint is satisfied. H T represents the 'total' terminal funding ratio after receiving in T recovery cp T .
π denotes the portfolio weights. In closed-form solutions, n denotes the standard normal density (n(z) = 1 2π e − z 2
2 ), N denotes the normal cumulative distribution, and B(x, y, ρ) is the cumulative Bivariate normal where the marginals x and y are standard normals and their correlation is ρ.
B Derivation of the Optimal Payoffs
Remark B.1. A u driver of the strategy:
First we solve the unconstrained static program: max
This solution thus uses the martingale approach of Cox and Huang (1989) . 16 Given the states of the world, the first-order condition reads (2005), we now use the unconstrained A u as a driver of the strategy, and without loss of generality we set here υ 0 = 1.
Theorem B.2. Generalised Risk-Shifting Portfolio Insurance
The optimal (X * T /L T , F * T ) are:
14 We thus rely on an 'asset-space' representation where A u is is used as a univariate driver of the allocation, when the s.d.f. representation involves both M and the liability L.
15 Thus σ F u represents the instantaneous σ F u ,t for the weight process and σ 2 F u stands for T τ σ 2 F u ,τ dτ in option pricing formulas. 16 In complete markets, the duality or martingale approach used is equivalent to solving the HamiltonJacobi-Bellman partial differential equation, but reliance on a static optimisation of the optimal terminal payoff is simpler. It is possible to extend directly the proof of Carpenter (2000) . Indeed, in the static optimisation problem at time-T, conditional to G T , the non-convex problem is similar, but with the minimum value F − (G T ) = [k − m G /β G T ] + to avoid zero terminal wealth, and an upper value F + (G T ) that depends on F − (G T ) thus on G T . We propose below a more detailed proof below.
Proof. of theorem B.2. The duality approach can be used in non-convex maximisation, see Basak and Shapiro (2001) . Carpenter (2000) 'convexifies' the utility function, but by standard non-convexity arguments we can also directly show that the agent's terminal funding ratio F T does not take any step in the stochastic non-convex region ]F − , F + [, so that it is only when m · F u T > F + that the standard convex solution is recovered. Below this threshold, the manager always targets precisely the unique F − .
C Graphical Illustration of the Strategy
The benchmark L is constant, and the problem normalised with α = β = 1; the multiplier m * = 1.8 with a guarantee K = 1 corresponds to a value k = 1.54 at time 0 of the compensation package (which can be interpreted as an option package worth 50% of the value of the fixed salary). The agent has risk aversion γ = 2; interest rates are constant and σ F u ≡ σ A u = 0.12 (constant); its drift is µ F u = 2%; σ G = 0.25 and ρ = .3
The following set of graphs show for τ = T − t at either 5 or 1 year the deltas or π PSP the weights strategy with respect to the speculative portfolio, π G with respect to either the principal's net asset value, and π S the weight allocated to the principal's shares.
Note that up to the point where the principal's shares S are valued, and used as a hedging instrument, m G plays no role, thus the first set of graphs can be thought as plotted with m G = 1, or the G axis representing m G · G t and derivatives being taken w.r.t. m G · G t .
C.1 Value of the Funds Managed by the Agent
The value of the funds F * t is an increasing function of F u . The value of the principal support increases in G, so that F * t decreases in G t . The kink when F u is between .8 and 1 is magnified when τ is small [1Y]; F * T decreases in G T : a higher G T decreases non-only the value of the put option on G T , but also that of the up option, because a higher G T increases F + (G T ) the strike of up.) C.2 Optimal Exposure to the PSP when G is Traded These figures show the delta of the strategy wrt F u t (shape of the risk-taking strategy) when τ = (1, 5). F * t has a positive delta to F u t because a rise in F u t always raises the probability of being into the high-value region, and because it raises the value of the exposure to F u t . When τ is small, the delta w.r.t. G is very humped-shape. The agent builds 'local leverage' to bet himself out the non-convex region [F − , F + ]. The magnitude of the bet increases linearly in
, and increases in G T up to the point where m G · G T = k.
C.3 Hedging of Principal's Risk when G is Traded
F * t has a negative delta to G t because the value in case of failure is a put option on G T , and because a higher G diminishes the probability of success of up T (F + (G T ) is an increasing function of G T ).
In addition, since F * is leveraged, the delta of F * w.r.t. G t also is. It can thus be lower than −m G . A distinctive feature in figure 8 is that the sensitivity of the value of the funds to G, while always negative, is not a monotonic function of F. In particular, the local leverage component means that this sensitivity is magnified at given 'intermediary' values (near the forward moneyness).
is always negative, and it can reach values that are a multiple of −m G .
D Generalisations
The idea of this section is three-fold:
1) clarify why this use of a numeraire L simplifies the derivation.
2) state that many variations of the form of the payoff can be considered (in fact, conditionally on the random benchmark, we will recover the problem we have here detailed, and in particular, conditioning again on Y T , the problem will be of known form.
3) state that this can be extended to any concave utility. Of course, pricing and hedging will be more demanding then.
D.1 Why the simplifications
We note that by denoting F = A L , we have in our problem F − = (1 − K/β ) independent of L T , and, provided the CRRA utility is on the terminal funding ratio F T , we also have that F + will be independent of L T . Such a simplification permits notational economy, since the expectations will not need to be conditioned on L T (it is then also computationally simpler), but does not modify the essence of the problem, see also Appendix D.
Here, thus, we have only one level of integration. If as in Koijen (2014) and Buraschi et al. (2014) we have a function involving various assets jointly, then one level of integration is needed to compute F u and σ F u , and another for the pricing of options on this portfolios, involving F u T |G T . Note that in this case, when needed, the additional complexity stems principally from G T |F u T .
In general, G T can have any form of correlation with A T , but it will of course be convenient in the application to consider a constant correlation (small manager even with non-linear performance fees on AM that also benefit the principal in a non-linear way; large entity where assets, though segregated, can be thought as belonging to the principal, who diversifies).
D.2 Fixed remuneration
Consider the problem
By conditioning on L T , one sees clearly that the optimal payoff in the success region will
. This problem will generally have dependence on L T in addition to the one we study on Y T (or G T ). The very form of A + depends on the utility function considered (see note above).
D.3 Generalisation of the MRS Theorem to any Differentiable Concave Utility
We note that the Maximum Risk Shifting Theorem directly extends to any concave function U(A, L). Denoting I L the inverse function of ∂U ∂ A , we have, for a λ such that the budget constraint holds, and with M T the stochastic discount factor
The put part has the same form in the exercise region regardless of the utility function (which however determines the exercise region), so the same singularity holds with any utility function when using principal shares as hedging instruments.
D.4 Generalisation of the MRS Theorem with a Benchmark plus a Utility Numeraire
In the above, we have considered that the numeraire L of the utility function also serves as a benchmark for compensation. This is arguably the case for an institutional investor who manages assets relative to liabilities such as nominal or real annuities. In other contexts, for instance, in fund management, the benchmark may be fund-specific (e.g. an equity index)
while the numeraire could be a more standard real bond.
When the agent's performance is assessed relative to a benchmark that is not relevant as a numeraire to her utility function, for instance, we denote B T the ratio of the benchmark to the relevant numeraire L T . While a variety of compensation packages are possible, the remuneration H T can be simply defined as: 17
In problem (10) 
The manager invests in the MVE portfolio to outperform her benchmark, which results in particular in leveraged positions on the MVE portfolio when it is the benchmark. When the state price of risk is very low and the MVE performs, the portfolio will tend to m/α · A u T + L T , and if L is the MVE, the portfolio weights will asymptotically be those of the MVE if the risk-aversion parameter γ > 1, 19 otherwise a proportion 1 γ thereof, i.e., the Merton constant. 20
In this seminal incentive problem, the optimal risk allocation involves a leverage component that is a monotonic function of the moneyness of the option. As the agent (the manager or portfolio manager depending on the context) 'shuns payoff that are likely to be near the money' (Carpenter, 2000, p231) , the leverage increases when the value of the assets falls, and becomes infinite when the asset value approaches zero.
Contracts that are designed ex-ante to offer unlimited, unconditional guarantees in all states of the world, thus yielding unlimited leverage and zero value of the assets are arguably not universally fit, and the recent literature has included some limitation to the under-performance that the principal is willing to tolerate from the asset manager; for hedge funds, the 'capital structure fragility induced by the possibility of investors withdrawing capital (and prime brokers forcing deleveraging)' (Buraschi et al., 2014 . A slightly simplified 21 version of the manager's compensation in (Buraschi et al., 2014 ) is:
19 It will also be the case if L is a riskless benchmark. 20 The Merton constant are the weights of A u in case the agent has CRRA utility on the terminal wealth. Note that when the benchmark has exposure to other factor than the MVE, the portfolio weights in Carpenter (2000) being asymptotically determined by the dominating portfolio, they usually depend on the asymptotic value of the ratio of the MVE to the benchmark. For this reason, we will sometimes rely on a notional F u and subsequent change of numeraire techniques.
21 The hedge fund manager-entrepreneur of Buraschi et al. (2014) receives a variable compensation equal to the management fees on indexed to the value of the fund A * , without taking performance driven flows into account.
Here, k is the fixed remuneration of the manager, while β · [L T − A T ] represents the loss that results from under-performance, which needs to be no larger than the fixed salary K · L T (or that any predetermined value only related to A and L).
In this case, the manager will ensure that β Note again that the non-convex region is identical over a variety of configurations. 22
Unless (as possibly in hedge funds) the manager is truly an entrepreneur, she receives a wage compensation, which in most relevant situations entails some risk, for instance job loss if the principal's financial situation 23 deteriorates strongly while the manager under-performs, an aspect which can be modelled as a default risk of the principal when the agent's losses are high compared to the principal's wealth.
So, the agent we study has limited liability up to a certain under-performance that depends on the stochastic wealth of the principal.
Maintaining the salary is thus a put option provided by the principal [the employer], and it is useful to rewrite the problem as the one we study:
22 For performance as 'risk-shifting' incentives, the wage can be indexed to A as long as incentives provide an additional indexation to A; for risk-control incentives, the fund manager may have a deep des-utility of wealth below certain level, face job risk or the risk of a loss in total wage.
23 It could be chosen to model the financial fragility of a third partye.g., that of the prime broker. This represents the case when G, the net asset value of the provider of the guarantee, is directly traded.
